Criminal Procedure--Justice of the Peace Courts--Increased Penalty upon Trial De Novo by Reppert, Anne C.
Volume 75 | Issue 4 Article 4
June 1973
Criminal Procedure--Justice of the Peace Courts--
Increased Penalty upon Trial De Novo
Anne C. Reppert
West Virginia University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anne C. Reppert, Criminal Procedure--Justice of the Peace Courts--Increased Penalty upon Trial De Novo, 75 W. Va. L. Rev. (1973).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol75/iss4/4
STUDENT NOTES
Criminal Procedure - Justice of the Peace Courts -
Increased Penalty Upon Trial De Novo
Appeal from a criminal conviction in a justice of the peace court
is generally held to be an absolute right. However, some problems and
uncertainties surround this right -in particular the constitutionality
of an increased penalty imposed after conviction in a trial de novo, the
usual appellate procedure in such cases. The recent Supreme Court
decision in Colten v. Kentucky' seems to dispose of this problem, hold-
ing that an increased penalty given in a trial de novo offends neither
constitutional due process rights nor constitutional prohibitions against
double jeopardy. On closer examination, however, the decision seems
to create more problems than it solves. The Court failed to address the
basic problem of a defendant's procedural rights in a trial before a
justice, determining the case instead on a much narrower ground.
Implicit in the Court's decision is a view of the justice of the
peace system that is, in some respects, inconsistent with the West
Virginia view. This inconsistency creates problems in applying the
decision to the West Virginia justice of the peace courts. The funda-
mental issue is the basic nature of the proceeding before a justice: If
it is a true judicial proceeding, one set of consequences will follow, but
if it is devoid of any judicial considerations, the result will differ.
The Supreme Court, in Colten, characterized the Kentucky justice
system as a hearing, devoid of any judicial authority or dignity. Justice
White labeled them courts of convenience not "designed or equipped
to conduct error-free trials ... ."2 Their purpose is to provide speedy
adjudication but not necessarily a trial with full constitutional protec-
tions.
The West Virginia court, on the other hand, views the justice of
the peace trial as a genuine judicial proceeding in which full state con-
' 407 U.S. 104 (1971). The defendant was arrested on a complaint and
warrant charging him with disorderly conduct, for which the maximum penalty
was six months in jail and a $500 fine. He was tried in the quarterly court,
convicted, and fined $10. Colten appealed his conviction to the criminal division
of the circuit court under Ky. R. CRrm. P. 12.02. In a trial before the judge,
Colten was again found guilty, but was fined $50. The increased fine was upheld
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d
374 (Ky. 1971). The United States Supreme Court affirmed.
2 407 U.S. at 117. The Court was quoting directly from Colten v. Common-
wealth, 467 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Ky. 1971).
372
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stitutional protections are available. Close control of the courts was
established as an early tenet of West Virginia jurisprudence.3 Statutes
were enacted to protect a defendant's procedural rights both prior to
and during trial.4 By allowing presumptions as to the correctness of the
justice court's procedure, the West Virginia court has in many in-
stances accorded the justice system somewhat the same stature as
courts of record.' The justice system is envisioned as a court of law,
not merely as a mechanism for a speedy trial.
Yet, to characterize the magistrate system as either a complete
judicial system or a totally non-judicial system is to fail to discern the
issue. In reality, the justice system is a hybrid, existing at some point
on the spectrum between these two polar concepts. A further examina-
tion of the Kentucky and West Virginia justice systems reveals the
fallacy of simple categorization. In Colten, Justice White described the
Kentucky magistrate courts as non-judicial mechanisms, yet these
3 W. VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 28, establishes the jurisdiction of justices as
well as the right to appeal from a justice's decision:
The jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall extend throughout their
county; they shall be conservators of the peace and have such juris-
diction and powers in criminal cases as may be prescribed by law..
Appeals shall be allowed from judgments of justices of the peace in
such manner as may be prescribed by law.
These powers are to be governed exclusively by statute, and any action by ajustice not within the boundaries of statutory law is void. State v. McKain, 56
W. Va. 128, 49 S.E. 20 (1904).
4The statutes setting forth the requirements for warrants are illustrative.
Proceedings before a justice require an arrest warrant issued in the name of
the State, except where the offense is committed in the presence of the justice
having jurisdiction or in the presence of a constable. W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art.
18, § 2 (Michie 1966). The warrant must be directed to and carried out by a
person authorized by the law to arrest those charged with crimes against the
State. Id. § 3. Procedure following the issuance of the warrant is governed by
and subject to the same strictures as apply to procedure in any criminal trial.
W. VA. CoDE ch. 50, art. 18, § 4 (Michie 1966), provides that the provisions of
W. VA. CoDE ch. 62, art. 1, § 1 (Michie 1966), shall apply after the warrant is
issued. A further indication of this concern for constitutional rights is the
statute providing the right to a jury trial wherever a fine exceeding five dollars
or imprisonment is authorized as a possible penalty. W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art.
18, § 7 (Michie 1966).
The docket and transcript of the trial are prima facie correct and are
not void for lack of complete recital of the facts. Ex parte Samuel & Sllvoo,
82 W. Va. 486, 96 S.E. 95 (1918); State v. Emsweller, 78 W. Va. 214, 88 S.E.
787 (1916). The court, in Emsweller, noted that at common law a recital of
facts was necessary in order for the docket to be valid but that this requirement
had been changed by statute. The orders and judgments of the justice court
are granted the same presumption of validity as those of courts of general
jurisdiction. State v. Vendetta, 86 W. Va. 186, 103 S.E. 53 (1920); Rush v.
Brannon, 82 W. Va. 58, 95 S.E. 521 (1918). However, one case has noted
that a judgment from a justice court is open to impeachment on the question ofjurisdiction, whereas a judgment from a court of record is held conclusive
except where lack of jurisdiction appears on its face or is a matter of record.
State v. Emsweller, 78 W. Va. 214, 223, 88 S.E. 787, 791 (1916).
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courts are authorized to conduct judicial proceedings and mete out
punishment in terms of fines and imprisonment.6 In contrast, the West
Virginia court's conception of the justice system is somewhat idealized;
in practice the statutory safeguards are not and cannot be provided.
Although procedural guarantees have been statutorily adopted,7 these
provisions are not as comprehensive as those governing trials of record.
Furthermore, no provisions exist requiring preparation and mainte-
nance of a record, an all important prerequisite for the intelligent
review of any decision. In addition, justices of the peace lack the
training8 and, to a certain degree, the interest9 necessary to properly
carry out those procedures that have been established. 0
6 Justices of the peace in Kentucky have exclusive jurisdiction over all
penal and misdemeanor cases in which punishment is limited by a fine of not
more than $20. They have concurrent jurisdiction with judges of the circuit
court over all penal and misdemeanor cases where the fine is limited to not
more than $500 or imprisonment of not more than twelve months or both.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 25.010 (1971). Furthermore, certain procedural rights are
accorded, such as the right to a jury trial, Id. § 25.014, and the right to an
appeal de novo, Id. § 25.070. While Kentucky terms this right an "appeal,"
the right is unconditional and does not require a showing of error. Ky. R.
CRam. P. 12.06. The criminal court is not bound by the justice court's finding
and, indeed, does not even take that finding into consideration. The right of
appeal extends even to convictions entered upon a plea of guilty. Brown v.
Hoblitzell, 307 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1956). Compare W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 18,
§ 1 (Michie 1966) (referring to jurisdiction of the court); W. VA. CODE ch.
50, art. 18, § 10 (Michie 1966) (providing a right to de novo trial); W. VA.
CODE ch. 50, art. 18, § 7 (Michie 1966) (setting forth provisions for the right
to trial by jury).
7For a summary of these guarantees, see note 4, supra.8 C. DAvis, E. ELKINS, & P. KIDD, Tm JUSTICE OF THE PEACE IN WEST
VmGI-IA 9-11 (1958). In a survey conducted in 1958, only four out of 144
respondents had any legal training: One had 1 year, one had 1.5 years, one had
2 years, and one had a law degree but did not practice. The following chart
gives an indication of the education background of the justices:
FORMAL EDUCATION OF JUSTICES*
Extent of Number of Percent
Education Justices of Total
Ph.D. 1 .69
L.L.B. 1 .69
M.A. or equivalent 5 3.47
B.A. or equivalent 8 5.56
1-3 years college 18 12.50
Business college 4 2.78
High school 38 26.39
9-11 years 15 10.42
6-8 years 50 34.72
Less than 6 years 2 1.39
No answer 2 1.39
Totals: 144 100.00
* Source: Questionnaires to Justices.
Id. at 9. The average education of a justice was 10.6 years, compared to 8.5
years for all Weat Virginians and 9.3 years for all United States citizens.
[Vol. 75
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These conflicting views oversimplify the characterization of each
justice court system, but it is difficult to quantify the judicial and non-
judicial elements found within the system. The important factor, how-
ever, is that both elements seem to be present in each state and must
be considered in analyzing any problem arising from such systems.
The theory behind each system of inferior courts affects its opera-
tion. This is illustrated by the Colten decision. The Court held that an
increased sentence, rendered upon trial de novo from a conviction in a
justice of the peace court, did not violate the defendant's procedural
due process rights. The decision was based on the distinctions between
Colten and the Court's earlier decision in North Carolina v. Pearce."
Pearce requires a judge, who imposes a stricter penalty upon retrial
after a successful federal habeas corpus challenge to the original pro-
ceeding, to set forth information concerning the defendant's conduct,
after the original trial, to justify the increased sentence. This strict
procedure seeks to insure that vindictiveness toward a defendant, for
successfully defeating his conviction, plays no part in the judge's
sentencing. 12
In distinguishing the two cases, the Court, in Colten, found no
threat of vindictiveness on trial de novo from a justice of the peace
9Id. at 10-11. Of those justices who responded, only 5.56% listed their
interest in the law as their reason for seeking office. While only 15.28% listed
the income derived as their reason for seeking office, it should be noted that
47% of those responding received their total income from fees.
10 See R. Staker, Proposed Enactment of Statute Empowering Trial Judges
to Issue and Try Defendant on Warrant Upon Dismissal, for Variance or
Invalidity, of Warrant in Case Appealed from a Justice's Court, Jan. 28, 1971
(unpublished paper in West Virginia University Law School Library). Judge
Staker noted that, in his years on the bench, over half of the appeals from
criminal convictions have involved warrants
so deficiently and insubstantially drawn that they were fatally de-
fective, as a matter of law, and had to be quashed, or else they have
been drawn not in accordance with the true facts and before trial
have had to be nolled anticipatorily, because a fatal variance with the
proof would have developed during trial.
Id. at 1.
"1395 U.S. 711 (1969). The defendant was convicted in a court of record
of assault with intent to rape and sentenced to 12 to 15 years in the penitentiary.
He later instituted post-conviction proceedings that led to reversal of his con-
viction. Upon retrial he was convicted and sentenced to a longer term. The
conviction was affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. In habeas
corpus proceedings in federal court, the harsher sentence was held unconsti-
tutional, a decision that was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in Pearce v. North
Carolina, 397 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1968), and later, by the Supreme Court.
12While the Court's concern for vindictiveness seems to stand out as the
principal reason behind the Pearce decision, there is a more fundamental reason
underlying Pearce; the mere possibility that the petitioner might receive an
increased penalty because he had embarassed the state court system was felt by
the Court to have a chilling effect upon the defendant's exercise of his constitu-
tional rights.
4
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court. 3 Unlike Pearce, the court in Colten's retrial was a different
forum from that which had originally passed sentence. Furthermore,
there was no record from the justice of the peace court that could
have been considered by the superior court. As a result, there was no
indication that the defendant would be treated more severely by the
de novo court than a defendant whose trial is an original action in that
court. 14
The Court pointed out that the defendant could secure a new
trial automatically and did not have to predicate it upon error com-
mitted by the justice court. Since the defendant had a right to a de
novo trial, it was not unfair to require the defendant to endure
proceedings in an inferior court in order to secure a proper trial. The
Court reasoned that the defendant was not thereby placed in a dis-
advantageous position: He received a simple, speedy, first trial and
had an opportunity to learn about the prosecution's case without re-
vealing his own.' s These options were not available to the state, since
the state had no right of appeal. Furthermore, the defendant could
plead guilty and secure a prompt trial de novo in a court of record.
The Court concluded that
[in reality his choices are to accept the decision of the judge
and the sentence imposed in the inferior court or to reject
what is in effect no more than an offer in settlement of his
case and seek a judgment of judge or jury in the superior
court, with sentence to be determined by the full record
made in that court.' 6
It is, however, not entirely clear whether the Colten decision is
applicable in West Virginia since the West Virginia court has adopted
an entirely different view of the justice system. The Court, in Colten,
13 There is of course a vast difference between a de novo trial from ajustice's conviction and a retrial from a successful habeas corpus proceeding
in federal court. While the threat of vindictiveness is more substantial in the
latter case, it is nonetheless a problem to be considered where there is a de
novo trial. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969).
14407 U.S. at 117-18.
1Id. at 118-19.
16 Id. at 119. Colten pleaded a second defense of double jeopardy, charging
that the Constitution did not permit the imposition of a more severe penalty
on reconviction. The Court had rejected this argument rather summarily in
Pearce and, in Colten, rejected it out of hand. Both decisions were based on the
theory that double jeopardy places no restrictions upon the length of sentence
imposed upon reconviction. While this rationale is dispositive of the point, it
should be noted that the facts in Cotten make that defense even less appropriate,
for "the defendant [could] bypass the inferior court simply by pleading guilty
and erasing immediately thereafter any consequence that would otherwise follow
from tendering the appeal." Id. at 119-20.
[Vol. 75
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stressed that the defendant had an automatic and complete right to a
trial de nova. Decisions from the West Virginia court do not seem
to guarantee that right. While the West Virginia court has generally
accepted the rule that appeal must be granted automatically, it has
curiously required some showing of error prior to allowing an appeal
from a guilty plea. This limitation on the right to appeal is not ex-
pressly provided by the appeal statute:
Every person sentenced to imprisonment by the judg-
ment of a justice, or to the payment of a fine of ten dollars
or more (and in no case shall a judgment for a fine of less
than ten dollars be given by a justice if the defendant, his
agent or attorney object thereto), shall be allowed an appeal
to the court of the county having jurisdiction thereof upon
application therefore within a reasonable time after such
judgment is entered.' 7
In construing the statute, the court has held the appeal right
absolute on the ground that it is necessary to protect the defendant's
constitutional right'8 to trial by his peers.' 9 Statutory requirements 0
as to recognizance, 2' the necessary fines,22 and the time in which the
appeal must be madeu have been liberally interpreted in order to
insure a new trial. Appeal is granted in the form of a trial de novo,2 4
17W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 18 § 10 (Michie 1966).
18 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
19 Harshbarger v. Phipps, 117 W. Va. 134, 184 S.E. 557 (1936); State v.
Richards, 91 W. Va. 22, 112 S.E. 187 (1922); State v. Tharp, 81 W. Va. 194,
94 S.E. 119 (1917); Vetock v. Hufford, 74, W. Va. 785, 82 S.E. 1099 (1914).
20 W. VA. CODE oh. 50, art. 18, § 10 (Michie 1966).
21 The failure to provide the necessary recognizance can be used to defeat
a defendant's right to be released from custody but not to defeat his right to
appeal. State v. Tharp, 81 W. Va. 194, 94 S.E. 119 (1917); Vetock v. Hufford,
74 W. Va. 785, 82 S.E. 1099 (1914).22 State v. Nangle, 82 W. Va. 224, 95 S.E. 833 (1918). The defendant was
fined $2.00 and $5.00 for failing to compel a child of school age to attend
school. He sought to have the fines increased to $10.00 (which was in excess of
the limits established for that offense) in order to make an appeal. The court
held that the right to appeal cannot be restricted where a fine of less than
$10.00 has been imposed. The defendant need only ask for a heavier fine to
bring his case within the provisions of the statute.23 Id. The court held that the requirement to appeal within a "reasonable"
time, as required by W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 18, § 10 (Michie 1966), must be
interpreted liberally to protect the defendant. Since the legislature established
no set time limit, the period is determined on a case by case basis. In State v.
Tharp, 81 W. Va. 194, 94 S.E. 119 (1917), a delay of six days was not an
"unreasonable delay," and in State v. Richards, 91 W. Va. 22, 112 S.E. 187
(1922), an appeal made within eighteen days was valid. To further protect the
defendant's rights, the court noted, in Tharp, that a justice may not delay an
application so as to defeat the defendant's right to appeal.
24W. VA. CODE oh. 50, art. 18, § 10 (Michie 1966), requires that:
If such an appeal be taken, the warrant of arrest, the transcript of the
6
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which does not consider or rule upon the possibility of error in the
first trial.25
Nevertheless, an exception has arisen where the defendant pleads
guilty in the original proceeding. This exception appears to have
originated as dicta in State v. Emsweller.26 While the court held that a
plea of guilty to a void warrant would not prevent the defendant from
exercising his right to a trial de novo, "[a] plea of guilty to a void
warrant sufficiently charging an offense might preclude right to an
appeal."27 The West Virginia court has continued to adhere to this
rule but has never decided a case in which the acceptance or rejection
of this principle was crucial to the decision.28 Specifically, appeal has
been permitted where the plea was not entered voluntarily or where
judgment, any bail and other papers of the case shall be forthwith
delivered by the justice to the clerk of the court, and the court shall
proceed to try the case as upon indictment or presentment, and render
such judgment, without remanding the case, as the law and the
evidence may require.
The federal rule followed by the West Virginia court is that the appeal vacates
the judgment of the justice and calls for a new trial without regard to the
judgment set forth by the justice. Elkins v. Michael, 65 W. Va. 503, 64 S.E. 619
(1909). The appeal merely "removes" the action to a court of record where
the case is tried as if it had originated in that court. Id. at 505, 65 S.E. at 620.25 The judgment and rulings of the justice court cannot be considered at
the second trial. Thus, there is no foundation upon which error can be
predicated or determined. State v. Kessinger, 144 W. Va. 209, 107 S.E.2d 367
(1959).
2678 W. Va. 214, 88 SE. 787 (1916). The defendant was convicted in a
justice court of a violation of the liquor laws. He applied for a writ of habeas
corpus, and upon denial of the writ he brought error. The judgment was
reversed, and the defendant was discharged. From a judgment denying an
appeal from the justice's conviction, the defendant brought error. The warrant
charging the defendant was found to be void. Lacking any evidence upon
which to try the defendant, the proceeding became moot (since the defendant
had already been discharged), and the writ of error was dismissed.
27 Id. at 227, 88 S.E. at 793. The court cited a Missouri case, City of
Edina v. Beck, 47 Mo. App. 234 (1891), and a New Hampshire case, Philpot
v. State, 65 N.H. 250, 20 A. 955 (1889), as authority. The Missouri case
provided direct authority on this point. It held that a plea of guilty in a mayor's
court precludes any appeal from the judgment entered on that plea, for once
such a plea has been entered, there remains nothing for the circuit court to
decide. The Philpot case does not provide such strong authority. Jurisdiction
over the particular crime was conferred on the police court by statute only
where the accused pleaded guilty or nolo contendere. Since the statute specifi-
cally afforded the defendant the right to be tried in a justice's court only upon
such pleas, the court felt that granting an appeal after the guilty plea would run
counter to legislative intent.
28 Both Browsky v. Perdue, 105 W. Va. 527, 143 S.E. 304 (1928), and
Niceley v. Butcher, 81 W. Va. 247, 94 S.E. 147 (1917), contain dicta sup-
porting this rule. A more recent case, Wright v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 371, 141
S.E.2d 76 (1965), stated that "[A] writ of error ordinarily will not be granted
upon a conviction by means of a guilty plea where the judgment is properly
entered." Id. at 376, 141 S.E.2d at 79. That case concerned a plea of guilty
in a court of record, although the court cited Nicely as authority.
[Vol. 75
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the defendant did not understand the consequences of his plea.29
Although the cases supporting this rule turn on very peculiar factual
situations, they seem to stand for the proposition that where the
defendant pleads guilty in the justice of the peace trial, some error,
generally a denial of constitutional rights, must be shown before an
appeal and the subsequent de novo trial can be granted.
There are basic reasons that should lead the West Virginia court
to adopt a rule contrary to Colten. Although the West Virginia court
has overemphasized the judicial nature of the justice tribunals, it has
nonetheless, correctly recognized that a certain judicial integrity
should be accorded them. Thus, it seems unfair to permit an increased
penalty upon trial de novo. However, most courts that have ruled on
the issue have not adopted this rationale, holding instead that an
increased penalty upon trial de novo does not violate a defendant's
constitutional rights.30 An examination of the factors emphasized by
these courts suggests the error of such a determination.3'
Some courts have held that the justice's lack of legal training
provides a strong argument for allowing an increased penalty on
29 1n Nicely v. Butcher, 81 W. Va. 247, 94 S.E. 147 (1917), the court
held that before a guilty plea can be accepted, the person making the plea
must understand what he is doing. In that case, the plaintiff had been arrested
on a warrant charging her with adultery. When she appeared before the justice,
she indicated her desire that the charges be dropped. The justice advised her
that this could be done for $20 plus costs, which she paid. When she later
looked at her receipt, she discovered that the justice had entered a guilty plea
on her behalf. The justice refused to change the plea or grant an appeal. The
court held that since the plea was not knowingly made, an appeal should have
been granted. Similarly, in State v. Stone, 101 W. Va. 53, 131 S.E. 872 (1926),
the court held that a plea of guilty must be voluntary before it can be accepted.
The defendant was convicted on a plea of guilty to possession of intoxicating
liquor. He was not allowed to get in touch with his family, was not advised
of his right to bail or counsel, was threatened with a greater fine and confisca-
tion of his automobile, and was surrounded by officers in a strange town. His
motion for appeal was granted.30 Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (lst Cir. 1969); Cherry v. Maryland,
9 Md. App. 416, 264 A.2d 887 (1970); People v. Olary, 382 Mich. 559, 170
N.W.2d 842 (1969); State v. Spenser, 276 N.C. 535, 173 S.E.2d 765 (1970);
State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
940 (1971); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 579, 186 S.E.2d 53 (1972);
Evans v. Richmond, 210 Va. 403, 171 S.E.2d 247 (1969). Contra, Wood v.
Ross, 434 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1970).
31 See Aplin, Sentence Increase on Retrial After North Carolina v. Pearce,
39 U. CIN. L. Rv. 427 (1970), which provides the analytical framework for
the following discussion in the text. See also Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake:
Harsher Penalties and the 'Successful' Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606
(1965). This article provided the first major argument against increased
penalties upon retrial, contending that such an increase violates constitutional
due process and equal protection rights.
8
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appeal.32 The lack of such training probably prevents the sentencing
justice from having any real understanding of proper punishment.
If the presence of a legally trained justice is essential to a fair trial and
sentence, the absence of such a justice seems to militate in favor of
allowing an increased penalty. 3
While this factor, taken alone, would seem to support such a
decision as Colten, other more important factors tend to obviate that
result. For example, most decisions permitting an increased penalty on
trial de novo rely on the fact that the second sentence was imposed by
a different court.34 Yet, even though the trial is set in a different forum,
the defendant remains faced with a dilemma. If he chooses to appeal,
he risks the possibility of a harsher sentence. This possibility alone
may inhibit a defendant from seeking a proper trial, even though such
a trial will be de novo. Thus, his constitutional right to a proper trial
is as greatly infringed as that of the defendant in Pearce.35
The most striking criterion stressed by the courts concerns the
absolute right to a trial de novo. The courts have reasoned that, since
the second trial is awarded as a matter of right without regard to
error, the defendant gives up nothing in seeking the second trial;
indeed, he gains a benefit.16 The defendant has two full opportunities
for acquittal, and, thus, it is fair that each trial begin at parity without
regard to the justice's sentence. 7 This analysis fails to recognize the
judicial aspects of the magistrate's court. Because a justice can punish
and adjudicate, the justice courts can have a real effect on a de-
fendant's rights and privileges. As such, its decisions cannot be ignored
so easily. Appeals are granted to protect a defendant's rights and to
32 E.g., People v. Olary, 382 Mich. 559, 170 N.W.2d 842 (1969). While this
factor must be considered in reference to the justice system, it should be noted
that in Colten the particular justice did have some legal training. The Court
stated, however, that this is generally not the case. 407 U.S. at 114 n.11.
33 Aplin, supra note 32, at 459. This argument is oriented toward the
public's right to see that a defendant, properly tried and convicted, receives his
due punishment. There is, however, an equally strong counter-argument based
upon a defendant's right to a fair trial. Where the public fails to provide a
trained justice, a prerequisite for a proper trial, it becomes unfair to require that
a defendant risk the possibility of an increased penalty in order to protect his
constitutional rights.
34 State v. Spenser, 276 N.C. 535, 173 S.E.2d 765 (1970); State v. S parrow,
276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971).3 5 Aplin, supra note 32, at 456. See note 11, supra.36 Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1969); People v. Olary, 382
Mich. 559, 170 N.W.2d 842 (1969); State v. Spenser, 276 N.C. 535, 173
S.E.2d 765 (1970); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 579,
186 S.E.2d 53 (1973); Evans v. City of Richmond, 210 Va. 403, 171 S.E.2d
247 (1969).37 Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353, 355 (lst Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 75
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insure an error-free trial, and it seems only logical that the defendant
in a trial de novo be granted the same privileges as any other appellant.
Principal among these privileges is the right to appeal, unhampered
by the threat of an increased sentence.
Before the West Virginia court can rule on any of the problems
attendant to an appeal from a justice court, it must first resolve the
dilemma resulting from the inconsistent views of the justice of the
peace system. The system defies hasty categorization, being neither
totally devoid of judicial validity nor of equal status with the circuit
court. When the system is viewed consistently by the court, problems
such as harsher sentences on appeal can be resolved. The ultimate
decision of the court on the issue of increased sentences upon retrial
is problematical. The immediate task is to determine the position of
the justice of the peace system on the judical spectrum and then
establish the procedural requirements necessary to implement that
theory.
Anne C. Reppert
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